A parameterized family of equilibrium profiles for three-player kuhn poker
This paper presents a parameterized family of equilibrium strategy profiles for three-player Kuhn poker. This family illustrates an important feature of three-player equilibrium profiles that is not present in two-player equilibrium profiles - the ability of one player to transfer utility to a second player at the expense of the third player, while playing a strategy in the profile family. This family of strategy profiles was derived analytically and the proof that the members of this family are equilibrium profiles is an analytic one. In addition, the problem of selecting a robust strategy from an equilibrium profile is discussed.Citation
D. Szafron, R. Gibson, N. Sturtevant. "A parameterized family of equilibrium profiles for three-player kuhn poker". Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), (ed: Maria L. Gini, Onn Shehory, Takayuki Ito, Catholijn M. Jonker), pp 247–254, May 2013.| Keywords: | |
| Category: | In Conference |
| Web Links: | ACM Digital Library |
BibTeX
@incollection{Szafron+al:AAMAS13,
author = {Duane Szafron and Richard G. Gibson and Nathan R. Sturtevant},
title = {A parameterized family of equilibrium profiles for three-player kuhn
poker},
Editor = {Maria L. Gini, Onn Shehory, Takayuki Ito, Catholijn M. Jonker},
Pages = {247–254},
booktitle = {Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
(AAMAS)},
year = 2013,
}Last Updated: July 09, 2020Submitted by Sabina P
